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Questions about tax evasion are as old as taxes themselves and will remain an area of 
discovery as long as taxes exist. To understand the impact of a tax system, it is important 
to know who complies with the tax law as well as who does not. Tax evasion is a large 
and growing problem in almost all countries. Alm (1999) reports the annual growth rate 
of unpaid US federal individual and corporate income taxes since 1973. Reliable 
estimates by the IRS suggest a tax gap of some US $257-298 billion in 2001 (for the 
federal income tax), which equals a non-compliance rate of about 15.5% to 16.6%. The 
exploration of tax non-compliance is relevant for many reasons. Tax non-compliance 
reduces tax collection and the tax performance within a country. It may also lead to 
externalities such as the increase of alternative taxes which adds to the tax burden of 
compliant taxpayers. Such externalities are particularly relevant when focusing on serious 
non-compliance, a topic that AUTHOR (2010, this issue) discusses. AUTHOR (2010) 
correctly point out that public and government tolerance of serious tax non-compliance 
may decrease as other firms or individual taxpayers bear the burden of financing public 
services. Tax non-compliance creates several areas of misallocation in resource use. 
Firstly, individuals may devote considerable energy to cheating on their taxes, and 
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secondly, taxpayers may make behavioral changes (e.g., choices of hours to work). In 
addition, the presence of tax fraud also requires the government to invest in resources to 
deter non-compliance. 
However, there is much in the field of tax compliance that remains unexplained 
and empirical evidence is essential to address the lack of insights. In their overview, 
Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998: 835-836) state: “Although many empirical studies 
of noncompliance have been conducted during the past decade, we believe that the 
empirical literature is still in its youth, with many of the most important behavioral 
hypotheses and policy questions yet to be adequately investigated”. A key limitation is 
the lack of knowledge regarding how to deal with serious non-compliance (SNC 
hereafter). Therefore, the AUTHOR (2010) paper is a timely contribution to the literature 
as it promotes the re-evaluation of policy strategies. I will start with public prosecution 
and media  
In this essay, I will identify and discuss specific and potential actionable policies 
to deal with SNC such as public prosecution, tax amnesties, rewarding honest taxpayers, 
and good governance based upon the current research findings and current state of 
knowledge. I will start discussing whether public prosecution and increased (media) can 
help dealing with SNC. Such a policy tool is discussed in AUTHOR (2010). I will stress 
that such a policy not only affects the opportunity costs of compliance but is also related 
to motivation considerations, social interactions and the visibility of non-compliance. 
Moreover, the efficiency of such a policy is also driven by the effectiveness of the 
deterrence system. In a next step, I will go beyond AUTHOR (2010) discussing further 
specific policies. First, I will analyze whether tax amnesties can help reducing SNC. 
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Many governments have implemented tax amnesties with the hope to be able to reduce 
SNC. Next, I will focus on rewards, a relatively novel policy, which may influence 
individuals‟ and firms‟ compliance behavior as a “carrot”. Instead of raising the relative 
cost of not paying taxes, the instrument of rewards raises the benefits of paying taxes. 
This policy essay then finalizes stressing the importance of governance quality to tackle 
SNC.  
There are several aspects that I will not address in detail but that are worthwhile 
to discuss shortly. It is highly unlikely that serious tax non-compliance happens due to a 
“mistake” or unintentionally. Focusing on SNC also requires the analysis of the actions of 
a whole range of actors. For example, tax practitioners may play a key role in 
understanding SNC. McBarnet (1992) states:  “Noncompliance raises many major issues 
for policy and for theory. But there is a real danger: in concentrating attention on 
noncompliance, the constructed and problematic nature of compliance will be 
overlooked, and wider issues – the role of tax practitioners in undermining declared tax 
policy; the different routes available to rich and poor, individuals and corporations, for 
escaping tax; the possible limits of the law – will be ignored. Legal tax avoidance, taking 
us into just these issues, should therefore be recognized as a key topic for research and 
analysis too” (p. 343). Several studies show that the average level of noncompliance is 
higher for returns prepared with paid assistance. Erard (1993) found that the use of a tax 
practitioner significantly increases tax cheating. Generally, taxpayers with professional 
help tend to have more complex tax forms, which opens the possibility to cheat or to 
avoid. Some studies report that the tax practitioner‟s penalty and the importance of the 
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client will influence the practitioner‟s willingness to recommend aggressive positions 
(see e.g., Reckers et al., 1991).  
An investigation of SNC also requires a better understanding of business non-
compliance, an area in which there is limited evidence available. In most of the studies on 
tax evasion, the research has focused on personal income tax and business tax evasions 
have received very little attention. This is quite surprising when one takes into account 
the economic importance of the business sector and the revenue importance of business 
taxation for tax administrations. New work in this area is relevant and will build on 
existing evidence. For example, there is some evidence in regards to VAT evasion. Agha 
and Haughton (1996) analyze French audits in 1984 and report that two-thirds of those 
audited had understated the value of taxable sales, and a quarter of them fraudulently. 
Two-fifths of those audited had overstated the value of taxable inputs. They also provide 
a summary for VAT tax evasion in different countries. For example, in the late 70s, 40% 
of the VAT revenues went uncollected in Italy and in the Netherlands, and a third of all 
firms had evaded some VAT. In addition, looking at SNC may also instigate an ambition 
to improve on existing knowledge about tax avoidance.  
 
Public Prosecution and the Media  
AUTOR (2010) stresses that a criminal record is likely to generate more damage than an 
administrative record to SNC and is picked up faster by foreign authorities. Media 
releases on criminal records or regulatory penalties affect the reputation of a company 
and may even affect corporate takeovers and banking licenses. This is an important point. 
Increasing (media) scrutiny and transparency can help to increase the expected 
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punishment and the opportunity cost of SNC. It provides an additional channel of 
external punishment and control. The stigma of SNC is now substantially larger. 
Reputation is key factor in the legal business world and many firms conducting SNC are 
active in the legal sector. The media has an incentive to report SNC activities as it 
generates attention. Several studies in the area of illegal activities such as corruption have 
shown that “sunlight is a good disinfectant” (see, e.g., Duggan and Levitt, 2002; Brunetti 
and Weder, 2003). Subjective opportunity costs and subjective estimated risk will alter as 
transparency increases. The empirical findings support that the subjective risk of getting 
caught is more closely related to the duty to comply than to objective risk factors (Scholz 
and Pinney, 1995).  
 However, research on tax compliance has also stressed that increased monitoring 
and penalties for noncompliance may enhance extrinsic motivation to comply with the 
law but conversely may crowd out the intrinsic motivation to comply with taxes. The risk 
is that honest taxpayers (individuals or firms) may perceive the increased monitoring as a 
sign that their intrinsic motivation is not recognized, which may result in opportunistic 
behaviour from previously compliant agents (Frey, 1997). On the other hand, it is 
possible to argue that interventions to prevent SNC are unlikely to damage the intrinsic 
motivation. Tax morale – the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes – is not expected to be 
crowded out as a policy of public prosecution is directed against large-scale dishonest 
taxpayers preventing them in a better manner to free ride.   
 In addition, social interactions may influence the effect of public prosecution. 
Discussions on social interactions can be found in the crime literature or more 
specifically in the literature on information cascades, fads, herd behavior or bandwagon 
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effects. Contagion effects have been observed in other illegal activities such as 
assassinations, hijackings, kidnappings, and serial murders (Bikhchandi, Hirshleifer and 
Welch, 1998). The relevance of social interaction and crime is explored by Glaeser and 
Saks (2006) who focus on the United States in their analysis both across cities and across 
precincts in New York. The results indicate that social interaction models provide a 
framework for understanding variances of cross-city crime rates. Individuals are more 
likely to commit crimes when those around them are doing so. We can expect that the 
own willingness be commit tax non-compliance depends on the tax non-compliance level 
of other individuals and firms in a society and that current tax fraud levels are affected by 
the past levels. The willingness to commit tax fraud is influenced by the perceived 
activities of peers and other individuals. Thus, a person‟s willingness to engage in non-
compliance depends on the lack of pro-social behavior of others. The more others are 
perceived to be non-compliant, the higher the willingness to be non-compliant. Frey and 
Torgler (2007) have found empirical evidence of conditional cooperation in the area of 
tax non-compliance by focusing on tax morale. Public prosecution will enhance the 
visibility of tax non-compliance and will therefore influence the perceived level of tax 
fraud activities. It may not only generate externalities in respect to SNC, but also non-
compliance in general. If prosecution is still perceived to be inefficient, tax compliance 
might be crowded out by such an increase in visibility. Kahan (1998), e.g., stresses: 
“When they perceive that many of their peers are committing crimes, individuals infer 
that the odds of escaping punishment are high and the stigma of criminality is low. To the 
extent that many persons simultaneously draw these inferences and act on them, 
moreover, their perceptions become a self-fulfilling reality” (p. 394).  
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Can Tax Amnesties Help? 
Tax amnesties are a major issue on the political agenda in recent history. In times when 
many governments are confronted with budget deficits, tax reforms gain importance. One 
strategy is to implement a tax amnesty as part of fiscal reform, the main purpose being to 
increase governments‟ revenues. It offers tax evaders the possibility of returning to the 
tax system without the normal imposition of penalties and fines. The government is 
particularly keen to reduce SNC in order to generate larger tax revenues. Therewith, an 
amnesty is seen as a possible vehicle to increase not only present but also future 
voluntary compliance, in the hope that tax evaders are ready to become honest in the 
future, and assuming that the delinquents will be less likely fall back into non-
compliance. However, the final success of a tax amnesty depends on the long-run 
revenue effects. It is debated whether, in the long run, tax amnesties undermine the 
motivation to pay taxes. For example, honest taxpayers may feel upset by an amnesty. If 
most taxpayers voluntarily comply with tax laws, the option of an amnesty given to a 
small group of (large) tax evaders can be understood as a violation of equity by a 
majority of taxpayers. Thus, it is also possible that an amnesty results in a lower ex-post 
level of tax compliance. 
It is reasonable to assume that governments invest for short-term political 
advantages in order to be re-elected. The political motivation lays in the immediately 
affordable advantages of a tax amnesty (see, e.g., the recent tendencies in Italy), so that, 
not surprisingly, many countries have more than one amnesty per generation. 
Unfortunately, regardless of the short-run political motivation, multiple tax amnesties 
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within a short interval reduce the efficiency of such a program. Government‟s credibility 
is reduced and individuals‟ tax compliance is crowded out since honesty is not honored 
which also lowers the opportunity costs of tax non-compliance, particularly for SNC. An 
amnesty can be interpreted as a signal that tax evasion is forgivable. The psychological 
costs of not complying are reduced when observing others‟ opportunistic behavior. An 
amnesty may induce anticipatory behavior of taxpayers. After an amnesty, previously 
honest taxpayers may anticipate further amnesties by reducing their tax honesty. 
Tax amnesties around the world have shown that most revenue collected generally 
comes from those with relatively small amounts of previously unreported taxes. Hard-
core evaders typically do not participate in an amnesty. This explains why amnesties 
rarely generate significant amounts of additional revenue (Torgler and Schaltegger, 
2005).  
 
Rewarding: An Alternative?  
It is relatively novel to investigate the impact of rewards on tax compliance, however, 
there is some anecdotal evidence about the implementation of rewards to reduce tax 
fraud, especially in Asian countries. For example, Japan offers audited taxpayers the 
opportunity to have a photo taken with the Emperor if they are found to be honest. In the 
Philippines, the names of audited taxpayers go into a lottery if they are found to be 
compliant with the VAT. South Korea provides access to airport VIP rooms, issues 
certificates or awards, and is considering the possibility of free parking in public parking 
facilities as rewards for honest taxpayers. 
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Rewards could be relevant for eliminating undesired behavior or for motivating 
desired behavior because it is perceived as supportive (see, e.g., Nuttin and Greenwald, 
1968). Indeed, the role of rewards in shaping both human and animal behavior has long 
been a subject among social psychologists (see, e.g., Thorndike, 1911; Skinner, 1953; 
Nuttin and Greenwald, 1968). However, there are only limited studies that analyze the 
possibility of pecuniary rewards as an incentive for taxpayers to be honest. While, as 
AUTHOR (2010) writes, public prosecution may increase the subjective opportunity cost, 
rewards may also increase opportunity costs of non-compliance.  
Yet, it is interesting to consider how do actors potentially involved in SNC react 
to rewards? Different subject groups may react differently to a reward system. AUTHOR 
(2010) stress that the alignment of opportunities, risks and incentives may be different for 
companies compared to individual taxpayers. So the question arises as to whether (large) 
firm will react to rewards. Firms are subject to important additional constraints, due to the 
competitive environment in which they operate. This produces incentives among the 
individual-decision makers to quickly discount a monetary reward into total tax liability. 
In such a case, only the relative price of rewards would work. Nevertheless, non-
monetary rewards may also be highly attractive to (large) firms. One useful form of 
reward would be that the tax office issues a certificate indicating that the taxes, to the 
best of their knowledge, have been correctly declared, that the firm has been cooperative, 
and that the taxes due have been paid on time. Such a certificate demonstrates that the 
firm acts as a “good” taxpayer which is an attractive reward for large firms as their 
reputation and image are improved. Shareholders may respond in a positive way by 
raising share prices; the firm may access more favorable conditions on the capital market; 
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and the customers‟ trust in the firm‟s products may increase. Comparative advantages are 
generated which also increases the opportunity costs of non-compliance. Currently, two 
studies have investigated the impact of rewards on tax compliance. Both allow (to a 
certain extent) an analysis of the impact of positive rewards in relation to other tax policy 
strategies. In both cases, support has been found for the case that rewards are a very 
strong policy instrument to enhance tax compliance (Alm, Jackson and McKee, 1992; 
Torgler, 2003).  
 
Governance Matters 
Recent studies have shown that governance also affects tax non-compliance, and the 
outcome in many countries may be explained by underlying political conditions. 
Countries may tend to achieve an equilibrium positioning with regard to the size and 
nature of their fiscal systems. This equilibrium largely reflects the balance of political 
forces and institutions. Sustainable changes are only generated when the system is 
„shocked‟ to a new equilibrium (Bird et al., 2006). If taxpayers perceive that their 
interests (preferences) are properly represented in political institutions and they receive 
an adequate supply of public goods, their identification with the state increases, and their 
willingness to contribute increases. On the other hand, in an inefficient state where 
corruption is rampant the citizens will have little trust in authority and thus a low 
incentive to cooperate. A more encompassing and legitimate state reduces the willingness 
to commit tax fraud. Generally, tax evasion can be seen as an “exit” option, a signal 
through which taxpayers can express their disagreement. Tax evasion restricts the 
government‟s ability to act as a Leviathan. Thus, tax evasion might reduce the tax 
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revenues and therefore the size of government, which provides a sign that governance is 
not working well. A sustainable tax system is based on a fair tax system and responsive 
government, achieved with a strong connection between tax payments and the supply of 
public goods (Bird et al., 2006). The level of SNC may also be affected by governance 
quality, reducing the opportunity costs of being compliant. Friedman et al. (2000) and 
Torgler and Schneider (2009) show that institutions affect the size of the shadow 
economy. Furthermore, there might be a crowding-out effect of morality among the tax 
administrators when there are many corrupt colleagues. If individuals and businesses 
believe neither that contracts will be enforced nor productive efforts protected, their 
incentive to be active in the shadow economy or tax evasion activities increases, 
strengthening the incentive to commit SNC. On the other hand, rules attained through 
active involvement enhance the level of rule obedience and the willingness to cooperate 
and act in line with those decided rules. The more people and companies are involved in 
establishing rules, the stronger is their sense of obligation (Cialdini, 1989; McEwen and 
Maiman, 1986). The way taxpayers are treated by the authorities affects their evaluations 
of authorities and their willingness to co-operate (see, e.g., Tyler, Casper and Fisher, 
1989). Tyler (1997) argues that understanding what people and companies want in a legal 
procedure helps to explain public dissatisfaction with the law and points towards 
directions for building public support for the law in the future.  
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